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THE ENTRY STRATEGY OF RECENT EUROPEAN DIRECT INVESTORS
IN THE USA
PETER J. BUCKLEY *
1. Introduction
The United States of America has long been regarded as the largest source coun-
try for foreign direct investment (FDI) - well over 50% of the world total of such
investment originates in the USA. However, until very recent times, little attention
has been paid to the USA as a host country for foreign investment or to those
foreign firms which have begun to produce in the USA.
Several changes in the world economy have been responsible for focusing atten-
tion on inward investment in the USA. Two major long-term changes have been: (1)
an increase in the size and number of foreign, particularly European, multinational
corporations (MNCs) and (2) a twofold change in relative costs consisting of (a)
changes in relative wage rates, USA versus Europe, and (b) increasing US protec-
tionism forcing firms to switch from exporting to the USA to direct investment in
the US market.
These long-term factors have been reinforced by short-term disturbances. First,
the currency realignments of the late 1960s and 1970s increased the dollar value of
several major European currencies. Second, the energy (or oil) crisis has led to a
redistribution of world currency reserves. Third, the depression of US stock prices
has meant that acquisitions of US companies have been cheaper for foreign
entrants. Finally, a significant shift in the attitude of non-US corporations toward
the US market has resulted in a more positive and aggressive strategy for US market
penetration. This change in attitude is particularly noticeable with respect to Euro-
pean corporations.
This new phenomenon, and the attitudes towards inward investment in the USA
have been a subject of recent controversy. New questions have been raised with
respect to the nature of the inward flow, the nationality of ownership of the
"invaders", the industrial structure, employment, balance of payments, and loca-
tion effects of the inflow. In addition, doubts concerning the accuracy of the US
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statistics on inward foreign investment have led to a plethora of new enquiries.
This article presents a brief description and analysis of the extent of European
direct investment in the USA. It also examines two crucial dimensions of market
entry behaviour of the investors: (1) the choice between greenfield entry and take-
over of a US firm, and (2) the ownership decision.
2. The extent of European direct investment in the USA
The book value of foreign direct investment in the USA at the end of 1978 was
$ 40,831 million [1]. This aggregate represents an increase from $ 26,512 million
in 1974 (when a new definition was adopted and a new "benchmark" study was
undertaken) [2] and from $ 34,595 million in 1977. Table 1 shows the figures for
overall direct investment during the period 1950-1978. In 1974 a 10% share was
taken to be sufficient for a firm to be classified as "foreign owned" (previously, it
had been 25%); hence, the break in the series. Fuller coverage was also achieved.
In the period 1977-78, foreign direct investment grew by 18%. Over the period
1974-78 it has grown by 54%, an average annual rate of 13.5%. European direct
investment grew by 17.4% in the year 1977-78, and by 65% over the period
1974-78, an average annual rate of 16.4%. European direct investment as a propor-
tion of total foreign direct investment has grown from 63.5 to 68.3% between 1974
and 1978. In 1978, European direct investment in the USA amounted to $ 27,895
million. This represents an increase from $ 16,847 million in 1974 and from
$ 23,754 million in 1977.
Table I
Foreign direct investment and Europeen direct investment in the USA. Book values at year end,
•1950-78 ($ million).
Year 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
FDI in US 3391 3658 3945 4251 4633 5076 5459 5710
EI in US 2227 2410 2575 2751 3049 3369 3598 3753
El % FDI 65.7 65.9 65.3 64.7 65.8 66.4 65.9 65.7
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
FDI in US 9054 9923 10815 11818 13270 13914 14868 18284
El in US 6274 7005 7750 8510 9554 10336 11087 12504
El % FDI 69.3 70.6 71.7 72.0 72.0 74.3 64.8 68.4
a 1974 Benchmark Survey - change in definition of foreign ownership: 10% foreign ownership
of voting shares, used as criterion (25% previously). Also wider coverage.
Source: Survey of Current Business (various) and author's calculations.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss2/5
P.J. Buckley / European direct investors in the USA
2.1. The national ownership of European investment in the USA
The total European proportion of FDI, 683%, has a very interesting breakdown
by nationality, as shown by table 2.
In 1974, according to the new benchmark survey which produced a "break" in
the series, the UK accounted for 21.6% of total FDI, the Netherlands 17.7%, Swit-
zerland 7.5%, followed by Germany 5.8%, and France 4.3%. In 1978 these figures
were: UK 18.1%, the Netherlands 23.9%, Switzerland 7.0%, Germany 7.8% and
France 4.7%. Thus, by 1978 the Netherlands had become the largest European
investor. And the German stake is growing rapidly.
Throughout the post-war period, until the re-emergence of German capital, the
Netherlands, Britain and Switzerland had been the most important source nations
for investment from Europe. Commonality, or at least approximation of language,
business and cultural links and historical connections have all played their part in
the continuing flow of British investment capital into the USA. The significant role
of Dutch capital has been largely the outcome of continued investment by a small
number of large multinational manufacturing and petroleum companies. Swiss
investment did not suffer the traumatic disruption of World War II and it is unusu-
ally highly concentrated in manufacturing.
From 1962 onwards, it has been possible to provide a more precise breakdown
of the ownership of European investments. From table 2 we can trace the slow and
cautious rebuilding of German investment in the USA and the emergence of
French, Belgian and Swedish investment in the global total. The Netherlands is now
(1980) the largest single European foreign direct investor in the USA.
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
6115 6604 6910 7392 7612 7944 8363 8797
4070 4452 4707 5128 5247 5492 5820 6076
66.6 67.4 68.1 69.4 68.9 69.1 69.6 69.1
1974 a 1975 1976 1977 1978
26512 27662 30770 34595 40831
16847 18584 20162 23754 27895
63.5 67.2 65.5 68.7 68.3
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2.2. Numbers offoreign and European direct investors in the USA
In a comprehensive survey of foreign firms in the USA, Arpan and Ricks suggest
that in 1978 there were over 1,460 foreign parent firms operating subsidiaries in the
Table 3
Numbers of foreign parent companies and their US subsidiaries in the Arpan and Ricks survey
of Manufacturers (1978).
Country of ownership No. of parent firms No. of US subsidiaries
United Kingdom 325 817
West Germany 287 710
Canada 253 535
France 129 294












South Africa 6 17
Ireland 2 15





Hong Kong 2 3










Of which European 1048 2580
% European 71.8% 75.2%
a Two Finnish "parent" companies have a joint subsidiary.
Source: Arpan and Ricks, Directory of Manufacturers in the United States (2nd ed. 1979).
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USA in mining, manufacturing and petroleum [3]. In addition, there were over 300
foreign owned sales companies. Table 3 shows that these 1,460 parent firms owned
3,433 US manufacturing subsidiaries. European parent firms numbered 1,048
(71.8% of the total) and subsidiaries numbered 2,580 (75.2%). By numbers of par-
ent firms and subsidiaries, the UK ranked first, with West Germany second. Dutch
and Swiss firms were less well represented by numbers of parent firms because their
investments were, on the average, larger than those of other nationalities. It is inter-
esting to note that two countries from Eastern Europe are represented in the USA,
as are subsidiaries of small European nations such as Iceland, Greece and the Irish
Republic (table 3).
2.3. Direct investment in the USA as a proportion of US outward direct investment
Table 4 compares foreign direct investment in the US (line 1) with US outward
foreign direct investment (row 3). It also compares European owned investment in
the US (row 2) with US ownership and control of European enterprises (row 4).
Although the ratio of European investment in the USA to US direct investment
in Europe has fallen from 129.5% in 1950 to 70.5% in 1960 and 32.7% in 1973, it
increased to 37.6% in 1974, with the new "benchmark study". In 1978, European
direct investment in the USA reached 40% of US direct investment in Europe. Total
foreign investment in the USA was only 24% of US outward direct investment.
2.4. The quantitative importance of foreign direct investment in the USA
The scale of foreign direct investment in the USA is put into perspective by the
fact that in 1974 foreign owned affiliates in the US had 1.1 million employees
(1.6% of private non-farm employment) and paid $ 11.4 billion in wages (1.9% of
private farm wages) [4]. However, its importance and salience is much greater than
this when we examine data at an industry and subindustry level. Foreign direct
investment in the USA throughout the 1980s and early 1970s was less than 1% of
gross private fixed investment, but in 1974 it accounted for nearly 35% of gross
private fixed investment [5].
2.5. Industrial classification of European subsidiaries
Table 5 shows the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the foreign owned
manufacturing subsidiaries and of European owned manufacturing subsidiaries in
the USA. Chemicals is the most important single sector by numbers of European
owned units, followed by non-electrical machinery, electrical equipment, and food
products. European firms are represented across the whole spectrum of manufactur-
ing industry.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss2/5
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Table 5
Industrial classifications ranked by number of foreign owned US manufacturers (1978).
Industry SIC Number Number of
of foreign European
subsidiaries subsidiaries
Chemical and allied products 28 598 538
Machinery, except electrical 35 569 461
Electrical and electronic equipment 36 358 248
Food and kindred products 20 239 189
Fabricated metal products 34 226 162
Primary metal industries 33 221 153
Instruments and related products 38 164 129
Stone, clay and glass products 32 139 102
Textile mill products 22 131 100
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 30 122 96
Printing and publishing 27 117 48
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 115 79
Transportation equipment 37 96 72
Paper and allied products 26 79 39
Petroleum and coal products 29 59 41
Apparel and other textile products 23 38 21
Lumber and wood products 24 27 16
Furniture and fixtures 25 37 30
Oil and gas extraction 13 29 9
Tobacco manufacturers 21 28 28
Leather and leather products 31 16 12
Metal mining 10 7 3
Non-metallic minerals mining 14 7 4
Anthracite mining 11 1 0
Total 3433 2580
Source: Arpan and Ricks, op. cit.
3. Takeovers versus greenfield ventures as means of entry to the US market
3.1. The "buy or build" decision
The advantages of greenfield ventures, where the entrant company starts from
scratch, can be listed. First, for a small company this approach is likely to be
cheaper. The scale of the operation can be matched to the firm's resources and to
the market, and expansion can proceed in accordance with the company's progress
and market penetration. Second, building a new plant means that there are no
inherited problems and no danger of overpayment for a package of resources, some
of which may be duplicated by the firm's own endowments. Third, there is less risk
of antitrust action with new plants, although policy is by no means consistent.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss2/5
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Fourth, the choice of location or locations is fully open to the entrant, and State
and Federal subsidies can help to reduce costs. Fifth, there may be a production
cost advantage in setting up a new plant, and the most modern techniques of pro-
duction and management can be instituted. Finally, and negatively, although no
less importantly, in some circumstances there are few suitable victims for takeover
in the US, so greenfield ventures may often be second best alternatives.
The proponents of takeovers point to the following advantages of this method of
entry. First, takeovers permit rapid market entry and allow a quicker return on
capital and quicker learning procedures. Second, takeovers involve the assimilation
of a going concern, and thus avoid cultural, legal and management problems, par-
ticularly those associated with the difficult "start up" period. Third, and perhaps
the major advantage of a successful takeover, is that the firm has bought a most
valuable and scarce resource - management. In the particular case of the US this is
of paramount importance, especially in the marketing area. The purchase of brand
names, distribution networks and ongoing research may make takeover a most eco-
nomical means of entry in terms of resources gained. Finally, takeovers disturb the
overall competitive structure of the industry much less than do new ventures. Con-
sequently, takeovers may prove to be cheaper because they avoid competitive war-
fare. This cheapness may be reinforced by the depression in US stock market prices,
provided that the entrant is from a strong currency area, such as Germany or
Switzerland. Drawbacks to the takeover arrangement include the difficulties of
evaluating the resources acquired and the associated danger of overpayment. There
may also be problems of integration of a previously independent unit into a larger
whole with different procedures, goals, orientation, etc. Finally, the search for the
correct victim involves heavy costs, notably those related to the time spent on the
project by skilled management personnel.
There can be no unequivocal decision on the relative merits of the two methods
of entry. Almost every circumstance will be different. However, the benefits of
acquisition may be said to depend on the strength of the European firms' techno-
logical advantages and may be preferable if there is a need to learn from US prac-
tice. The acquisition route will be enhanced by the potential distribution facilities
available. The ability to evaluate the investment correctly is vital, as is the ability
to withstand possible Justice Department enforcement of antitrust laws. Finally,
it is essential that the European company possess sufficient managerial resources
to ensure good communications because this facilitates the feedback to Europe of
the advantages resulting from the absorption of a previously independent US com-
pany.
3.2. Recent takbover activity by European firms in the USA
The takeover of US corporations or divisions of US corporations by European
firms has become much more marked in the recent past. Table 6 provides an anal-
ysis by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories of European takeovers
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documented by the author in the period 1976-1979.
Table 6 provides an interesting comparison with table 5, which shows overall
numbers of investments in the USA. Chemicals, food, electrical and non-electrical
machinery occupy the top four places in both tables, indicating that these are areas
of past and current comparative competitive advantage of European firms. How-
ever, certain "traditional' areas of European strength, such as textiles, apparel and
primary metals, have declined in recent years as table 6 illustrates. The non-indus-
trial sectors, included in table 6 but not table 5 (which covers industry only), are
of current and increasing importance in the takeover activity of European firms.
Table 6
Recent takeovers of US firms by European firms, by sector 1976-79.
Sector SIC British Other Total
European
Chemicals and allied products 28 11 23 34
Food and kindred products 20 21 13 34
Electrical and electronic equipment 36 15 15 30
Machinery;except electrical 35 14 4 18
Stone, clay and glass products 32 10 4 14
Fabricated metal products 34 5 4 9
Transportation equipment 37 2 7 9
Banking - 5 3 8
Insurance - 4 4 8
Retail - 2 4 6
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 4 1 5
Printing and publishing 27 2 3 5
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 30 3 1 4
Petroleum and coal products 29 3 1 4
Paper and allied products 26 3 1 4
Finance - 4 - 4
Other non-industrial - 4 - 4
Hotels and restaurants - 3 - 3
Textile mill products 22 3 - 3
Real estate - 2 - 2
Instruments and related products 38 1 - I
Lumber and wood products 24 1 - I
Distribution - 1 - I
Non-metallic minerals mining 14 1 - 1
Leather and leather products 31 1 - 1
Oil and gas extraction 13 1 - 1
Primary metal industries 33 1 - 1
Apparel and other textile products 23 - 1 1
Mixed/not known 17 8 25
Total 144 97 341
Source: Author's compilation from press releases.
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Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the type of takeovers made by European firms in the
USA. The vast preponderance of both UK and "other European" takeovers are in
the "same type of customer/product related technology" category. In other words,
the European firms are diversifying horizontally by acquiring a similar type of firm
in the USA. British firms seem to carry out rather more investments of a vertically
integrated type, producing inputs for another part of the same firm. In both groups
there are very few investments made in "unrelated technology" firms. The larger
number of UK conglomerate takeovers, where the acquired firm is of unrelated
technology and with a new type of customer, is inflated by a number of projects
undertaken by one firm - Thomas Tilling. The pattern of "same type" takeover
activity is in line with the a priori expectation that entrants to the USA would
attempt to capitalize on their existing strengths (in either technology or marketing
or both) when assimilating a new US venture.
3.3. Finding an acquisition
The market for firms in the USA is extensive. European finms profess themselves
amazed at the extent of this market. Both whole companies and divisions of corn-
Table 7
Classification of 144 recent UK takeovers of US firms, 1976-79.
New missions New products
customers Related technology Unrelated technology
Same type 77 1
Firm its own customer 22 1
Similar type 9 5
New type 7 8
Not known: 14




Of which (a) Marketing and technology related 9
Of which (b) Marketing related 5





Source: Classification from H. Igor Ansoff, Corporate Stratagy (Penguin Harmondsworth,
1968). Basic data from author's own research.
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Table 8
Classification of 97 recent European takeovers of US firms (excluding UK) (1976-79).
New missions New products
customers Related technology Unrelated technology
Same type 56 1
Firm its own customer 9 0
Similar type 4 1
New type 2 4
Not known: 20




Of which (a) Marketing and technology related 4
Of which (b) Marketing related I





Source: As table 7.
paries can be bought and there exists a freer attitude of "everything is for sale at a
price", especially if existing management is to be allowed to retain a large measure
of independence in the new subsidiary. Moreover, America is still a country of
successful small and medium-sized companies. Frequently, however, European com-
panies (particularly first-time entrants into the US market) experience difficulty in
finding a suitable potential "target".
A major avenue for finding acquisitions is previous contacts made in the course
of normal business activities. The US firm may be a customer, supplier, distributor,
agency licensee or competitor of the investor. Such connections seem to be far less
often the route to takeover in the United States than in other host countries. Con-
sequently, other means have to be employed to find potential acquisitions. Rank-
Hovis-MeDougall painstakingly sifted a computer analysis of 1,600 US companies
before drawing up a short list of fifty "possibles". For a wide ranging acquisition
strategy, a US presence by a high ranking executive is crucial to success. Thomas
Tilling, for instance, sent their Deputy Managing Director to the US; GEC (UK)
hired a top executive to establish a base in California in order to mount a US acqui-
sitions search. Acquisition contacts are often made in the US through specialized
industrial "technical counsultants", via management consultancy firms or through
investment brokers. Brown and Willianison (British American Tobacco's main US
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss2/5
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subsidiary) reportedly became aware of the availability of Gimbels Department
Stores through Brown and Williamson's investment brokers, and purchased 93% of
the stock. There also exist specialist "finders" or "merger brokers", who make it
their sole business to seek out firms for a client to acquire. Business lawyers and
accountants have also been sources of useful information on the availability of
potential acquisitions.
Clearly, each acquisition is different. There are, however, several regularities in
European takeovers of US concerns which have emerged. In general, cash acquisi-
tions have been preferred and there are strong reasons for this. First, US share-
holders will usually be unfamiliar with foreign securities, except well-known, estab-
lished, worldwide concerns. Second, the seller benefits from a cash sale because of
the relatively low rates of capital gains tax (a maximum of approximately 25%).
From the purchaser's point of view the critical factor may well be the price of
the purchase. Analysts agree that the price may depend on the type of company
acquired and that a premium may be required for control. Recent acquisitions of
large public companies suggest that the minimum offering price must be at least
40% up on the current stock market price (see table 9, columns 7 and 8) and much
above the price one month before the offer. Differences between columns 2 and 3
show the importance of information "leaks". Clearly, minimization of such leaks
can save the European firm large amounts of money. A minimum of ten times
yearly earnings seems also to be the norm, although the US markets are very much
influenced by short-term indicators, notably quarterly earnings performance. Sub-
stantial "insider holdings" may require further mark-ups if 100% control is desired.
Private companies, which constitute the majority of foreign acquisitions, tend to
charge certain expenses to the company which foreign companies would not bear.
Consequently, some private companies may be relatively undervalued. Often, Euro-
pean companies employ the "delayed earn out" form of purchase, whereby the
seller agrees to be paid from the future profits of the acquisitions. This gives protec-
tion to the buyer, for he only pays when results have been achieved. Another type
of acquisition is the purchase of a subsidiary or a division of a US company. Prob-
lems of valuation arise here from the allocation of corporate overheads and general
valuation of the worth of the purchased assets when separated from the current
owner.
The time taken to find and complete an acquisition can vary from six weeks to
over five years. The median period for the process of acquisition appears to be
between nine and twelve months.
3.4. Greenfield ventures in the USA
Despite the recent upsurge in takeover deals as the means to entry, there are
many situations in which European firms prefer to build new facilities rather than
acquire existing ones. The most recent figures from the New York Conference
Board show that in 1979, 54% of investments surveyed were greenfield ventures, a
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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figure which had increased from 49% in 1978 [6]. Many smaller firms feel that
greenfield entry is cheaper because they cannot raise the capital necessary to buy a
viable unit and do not feel that they wish to acquire a cheap but problem-ridden
firm. In some cases there is a lack of desirable "victims". Some entrant firms want
to start off by imposing their own methods, values and attitudes toward business
and feel that this is incompatible with the takeover of an existing business.
Perhaps the main advantage is that greenfield ventures give complete freedom in
choice of location, size and growth. The plant can be sited where inputs, labor and
land are cheap and where communications with the market and/or parent firm are
optimal. Choice of location allows low operating and distribution costs to be
achieved. Regional and state incentives can be used to minimize start-up costs. The
plant can be of a size chosen to match the company's outlay but with an eye on
expansion possibilities. Growth can be achieved piecemeal and in line with achieved
market penetration, whereas a takeover represents a "lumpy" investment.
Greenfield ventures have several drawbacks. One of these is that entry is often
slower. A takeover results in an immediate market presence, while in a greenfield
venture the length of the gestation period of the investment must be considered.
Takeovers may also buy goodwill, established products, brand images and manage-
ment skills, although of course some of these attributes can be negative factors too.
It is likely that greenfield entrants will need more local advice. They will also have
to choose and establish a management team from scratch and undertake the
expense of building an adequate distribution network. These factors will all interact
with other elements of strategy, product/market position,method ofproduction and
distribution, technological ability, and the form of organization adopted. Take-
over versus greenfield entry cannot be considered in isolation from the firm's strate-
gy as a whole.
Approximately half of recent European entrants have employed the greenfield
method of entry. For example, Guest Keen and Nettlefolds (GKN), the UK's largest
heavy engineering group, have opened GKN Automotive Components Inc. in South-
field, Detroit (October 1978). GKN's investment is a response to new US automo-
bile regulations which have resulted in a massive demand for components. GKN feel
that they need to have a world presence in order to supply components for the new
generation of "world cars". They envisaged the possibility of up to six plants of a
"manageable" size (employing about 500 workers each) in the US.
These greenfield ventures required the building up of a completely new manage-
ment team. Interestingly, GKN employed the takeover method to establish a distri-
bution network when they acquired Parts Industries of Memphis for $ 100 million,
and they have taken care to add to this internal network of warehouses by "signing
up" a total of 150 distribution warehouses to capture a large share of the important
"aftermarket", Le. replacement sales.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss2/5
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3.5. Entry via minority holdings in US companies
In contrast to British and Dutch firms investing in the US, French and German
firms have entered the US in large numbers by purchasing minority holdings in US
companies. Table 10 shows some of the most important recent instances. Share-
holdings below 10% do not, under US Department of Commerce rules, count as
"direct investment". Such minority equity holdings are often part of research
sharing or joint marketing agreements.
Rhone-Poulenc SA (France's largest chemical and textile company) tied its
minority share (which nevertheless made it the largest single shareholder) in Mor-
ton-Norwich, a diversified manufacturer of salts, household products and specialty
chemicals to a two-way marketing agreement. Morton-Norwich will have the right
to develop and market in the US any pharmaceutical compounds discovered by
Rhone-Poulenc; Similarly, Rhone-Poulenc will have rights to new Morton-Norwich
pharmaceuticals in France. The US company gains rapid access to new drugs and a
strengthened product line. Rhone-Poulenc gains a much stronger marketing foot-
hold in the US and the right to acquire additional Morton-Norwich shares through
open market and privately negotiated purchases [7]. Similarly, the German truck
manufacturer, M.A.N., used a minority purchase to extend its marketing foothold in
the USA. White Motor will market M.A.N.'s medium-sized diesel trucks (inter-city
deliveries) where there is a US market gap, with the possibility that MA.N. will sell
and assemble White Motors' trucks outside North America - possibly using MA.N.
components [8]. Renault, the state-owned French car manufacturer, followed its
20% stake in Mack trucks with a stake in the fourth largest US car manufacturer,
American Motors. American Motors have built and assembled Renault cars in the
US since early 1978. The problems of the US car industry in adapting to higher oil
prices are believed to have tempered antitrust reaction to such deals. Renault will
supply two directors for American Motors' board.
4. Ownership strategy of recent European entrants to the US market
The pros and cons of joint ventures with US capital
The arguments for 100% control of an overseas subsidiary are easily stated. First,
control from the parent is complete. There is no interference from "outsiders" who
may not fully share the goals of the parent company. There is also no conflict over
particularly contentious issues of company policy such as internal transfer prices,
location of new investments and retention versus payout of profits. At best this
could involve "persuasion costs"; at worst it could alter company policy. Second, if
the parent can supply all of the inputs to the investment (management, technology,
capital, etc.), then these will be available at lower costs, because of shared over-
heads, and there will be no need to risk any problems outsiders may bring with
them.
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The arguments in favor of entering a joint venture agreement depend upon the
complementary nature of the resources of the partners. First, the European com-
pany's capital outlay will be reduced and the risks of the venture will be spread
between at least two parties. Second, in the United States,joint ventures are easily
reversible and the risks of permanent damage from an ill-matched partnership con-
sequently reduced. However, the major argument in favor of joint ventures in the
US is the increase in local knowledge and expertise that is gained by the acquiring
company. This is particularly true in the fields of management, marketing and labor
relations. Complementarities between European production skill and US marketing
ability have led to fruitful cooperation in many industries.
The world boom in investment in microelectronic chips has included widespread
interest of European firms in US developments - including joint ventures in the
US. Table 11 summarizes the 1979 involvement of European firms in American
micro-chip companies. Increasing development costs have led to takeovers of many
leading innovators by large, more widely diversified companies. Much European and
US investment has been made in response to worldwide competition by Japanese
companies who appear to have reduced the US technological lead. Joint ventures
between large European companies with marketing expertise and US venture capital
appear to have been very successful in meeting the new challenge of combining
product design with innovative techniques. Many such joint ventures also have ope-
rations outside the US. A major motivation in such high technology industries is the
acquisition of US technology and innovatory know-how.
However, despite these advantages of joint ventures, European companies have
shown a preference for wholly owned subsidiaries. Table 12 shows that of the 40
foreign investors in the US surveyed by Daniels, 21 firms preferred a wholly owned
US subsidiary, although only 13 actually began with a wholly owned subsidiary
[9]. For 6 firms this was because of financial considerations (3 could not get
Table 11
European corporate investments in US semiconductor companies (1979).
European investor US company
Siemens (\Vest Germany) Advanced Micro Devices
Robert Bosch (West Germany) with Borg Warner American Microsystems
Schlumberger (Netherlands Antilles) Fairchild Camera
Inmos (UK) - National Enterprise Board Inmos Inc.
Ferranti (UK) Interdesign
Siemens (West Germany) Lintroxin
Philips (Netherlands) Signetics
Lucas Industries (UK) with Electronic Engineers California SiliconNx
VDO Adolf Schindling (West Germany) Solid State Scientific
Schlumberger (Netherlands Antilles) Unitrode
Source: Financial Times (Oct. 16, 1979).
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Table 12
Preference versus actual equity position of 40 foreign investors in their first US manufacturing
investment.
Equity preference Total number of Actual postition in
firms expressing first US investment
preferences
100% Less than 100%
100% 21 13 8
Less than 100% 9 7 2
Flexible 10 7 3
40 27 13
Source: Daniels op. cit. at 59.
foreign exchange out of their home country, and 3, because of the need to start
with a large subsidiary, had to get US help in raising the capital). Two firms sought
partners because they felt a need for partners experienced in management and
marketing to enable them to meet US competition. Franko's survey of 49 investors
in the US showed that 70% of subsidiaries were wholly owned and that of the other
30%, 10% were joint ventures with corporate, family, or individual private share-
holders [10]. This was attributed to the desire to retain control. Franko also found
a high "divorce rate" amongst joint ventures, for at least 10 of the 69 subsidiaries
of the sample firms started as joint ventures, but became wholly owned later. Of the
49 firms, 29, or 64% had only wholly owned subsidiaries, and 10 companies
accounted for all of the joint ventures with managerially interested partners (8 such
firms could be described as high technology producers). This suggests that a cor-
porate philosophy on ownership policy is a major determinant of attitudes toward
local shareholdings in US subsidiaries.
The nine-volume study, "Foreign Direct Investment in the United States", con-
ducted by the Department of Commerce, investigated 69 illustrative cases of the
financing of foreign investment in the USA [11]. The cases covered 23 industries
(mainly in manufacturing) and ranged in size from $ 20,000 to $ 250 million - the
average size being $ 41 million. The investment methods used are shown in table
13, divided into three categories: new ventures, acquisitions of US companies, and
joint ventures with a partner already in the US. Two important factors were identi-
fied: (1) financing considerations rarely influenced the investor's choice of invest-
ment method, for the decision was based on more general business strategy, and (2)
larger foreign entrants sought geographical diversification through acquisitions
because of the greater speed inherent in this method of entry.
Overall, the desire for joint ventures is less than would be expected a priori,
given the resources of the US economy and the difficulties in achieving viable mini-
mum size in the US. This must be balanced against the very strong desire of inves-
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Table 13
Investment method used by 69 foreign investors in the USA.
Pre-1970 1970-75 Total
No. of % No. of % No. of %
firms firms firms
New ventures 4 29 14 25 18 26
Acquisitions 9 64 32 58 41 59
Joint ventures (with
a partner already in
USA) 1 7 9 17 10 15
14 100 55 100 69 100
Source: US Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States
(Washington, 1976).
tors to control their overseas subsidiaries and to extract all the rewards for the
benefit of the company as a whole.
5. Conclusion
Although foreign direct investment in the USA accounts for less than 4% of total
private investment in the USA, it is an increasingly important element in the world
economy. European direct investment in the USA has shown a marked increase in
the late 1970s and it accounts for more than two-thirds of total foreign direct
investment in the USA [12].
In addition to the high proportion of total foreign investment in the US
accounted for by European firms, in certain subsectors of industry and the service
sector, European subsidiaries are of great importance. In chemicals, non-electrical
machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, food products, petroleum, banking,
finance, and insurance, European firms contribute greatly to the size, growth and
innovatory ability of the economy. In rapidly developing sectors based on new
technology, such as micro-electronics, European firms, particularly in joint ventures
with US firms, have a very significant presence in the USA and worldwide. Many
European firms, particularly long-established ones, are household names in the
USA.
The recent takeover "boom" by European firms entering the US market is evi-
denced by the large number of takeovers both large and small. Analysis shows that
these takeovers are largely of horizontal diversification type, with European firms
operating projects in the USA with related technology and similar types of cus-
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tomers. Very few takeover entrants are of the conglomerate diversification type,
although a small number of European entrants have a definite strategy of conglom-
erate expansion in the USA. It is logical that in entering a difficult and large mar-
ket, European firms should attempt to utilize existing strengths and know-how
rather than attempt to move into new fields.
These takeovers are matched by approximately equal numbers of greenfield ven-
tures which, despite the cost and complications of starting in this way, provide
greater flexibility, particularly in choice of locations.
Joint ventures require complementarity between the partners, but in areas of
high technology and specialized marketing techniques, such "meshing" is becoming
more apparent where European and US expertise is compatible and mutually
strengthening.
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